20STCV11617

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Electronically #LED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 03/24/2020 09:32 AM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Barel, Deputy Clerk

1 Terrence Jones (Cal. Bar No. 256603) THE LAW OFFICE OF TERRENCE JONES, APC 2 6737 Bright Avenue, Suite B6 Whittier, California 90601 3 213.863.4490 | Terrence@JonesOnLaw.com 4 Attorneys for Plaintiff JESSE LEON 5 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 8 9 JESSE LEON, an individual, 10 Plaintiff. 11 v. First Cause of Action 12 JOSE HUIZAR, an individual; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipality; and DOES 1-10, 13 inclusive. **Second Cause of Action** 14 Defendants. 15 **Third Cause of Action** 16 17 Fourth Cause of Action 18 Workplace Harassment 19 Fifth Cause of Action 20 21 22

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Case No. 20STCV11617

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Wrongful Termination – Retaliation (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940(a),(h), 12945(a))

Wrongful Termination – Retaliation (Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b))

Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k))

(Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a),(h),(j))

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES | DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW Plaintiff Jesse Leon ("Leon or "Plaintiff"), who brings this Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") against Defendants—Jose Huizar, Councilmember for the City of Los Angeles' 14th District, in his individual capacity, the City of Los Angeles (the "City"), a municipality, and Does 1-10, inclusive (collectively, "Defendants")—alleging, based upon personal knowledge and information and belief, the following with respect to Defendants' identities and conduct:

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

- 1. This is a retaliation- and whistleblower-based wrongful termination lawsuit brought against Los Angeles City Councilmember Jose Huizar and the City of Los Angeles by Jesse Leon, who has become the third staffer that the Councilmember has fired after learning that Leon spoke out about practices that he believed Huizar was engaged in that violated local, state, and federal law. Leon shared his concerns about Huizar's illegal, unethical, and immoral conduct with the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, the City Ethics Commission, and the FBI—all of which Huizar became aware, all of which angered Huizar and engendered in him retaliatory animus, and all of which prompted the Councilmember to fire Leon.
- 2. In particular, Leon shared his concerns that he believed Huizar was attempting to undertake a "pay-to-play" scheme in which the Councilmember intended to extort commercial cannabis operators seeking to do business within his Council District by conditioning operators' ability to secure a "Public Convenience or Necessity Application"—a permit which would allow them to do business within Huizar's district and a permit over which Huizar had sole discretion to issue—upon political donations, "consulting fees" funneled to the Councilmember's friends, and cash payments made directly to Huizar.
- 3. Such was the same tactic that many believed Huizar employed with real estate developers as chairperson of the City's Planning and Land Use Management Committee ("PLUM Committee"). In those circumstances, too, Huizar—who had the sole discretion to put major development projects on the PLUM Committee's agenda for a go or no-go vote—would

refuse to do so unless those developers had adequately donated to his high school alma mater's fundraisers, paid into Huizar's political coffers, or otherwise paid directly into Huizar's pocket.

- 4. Thus, Leon's meetings with City and Federal authorities infuriated Huizar, who knew that Leon—who was among the Councilmember's senior executive staffers, who had served as the Campaign Manager for Huizar's most recent 2015 reelection, and who is a licensed attorney—was in a better position than most to credibly describe the Councilmember's conduct and practices.
- 5. And, in any event, Huizar had already began to confront, harass, shun, and retaliate against Leon on account of the Councilmember's belief that Leon had helped orchestrate two preceding wrongful termination lawsuits against Huizar and the City brought by two other staffers who had likewise spoken out about the Councilmember's practices that they believed violated local and federal law. Those staffers—Mayra Alvarez and Pauline Medina—were similarly pushed out of their jobs by Huizar in 2018 after complaining about his misconduct.
- 6. Among other things, both Alvarez and Medina had complained about having to alter Huizar's calendars in response to requests made pursuant to the California Public Records Act, having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife, Richelle, during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources, and having to engage in fundraising activities for Huizar's high school alma mater, Bishop Mora Salesian High School. As well, both Alvarez and Medina had voiced concerns that Huizar was having yet another extramarital affair with another one of his young staffers and that that woman was receiving preferential treatment with respect to assignments and attendance.
- 7. Leon shared all of this with the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and the FBI: that Alvarez's and Medina's allegations were true; that Huizar was again engaged in an intra-office affair; that Huizar had pushed Alvarez and Medina out for speaking up; that Huizar had confronted Leon about encouraging those women to file lawsuits against him and the City; that following the FBI raids Huizar appeared to have begun turning his "pay-to-play" attention to cannabis; that Leon believed that Huizar was engaged in conduct designed to extort

applicants for cannabis permits within his Council District; and that Leon, who had been assigned to be one of the Councilmember's cannabis policy advisors, was fearful that he might get caught up in Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct.

- 8. Thus, having recently learned about Leon's meetings with the City Attorney's Office and City Ethics Commission with respect to cannabis, Huizar became even further infuriated and paranoid by Leon's disclosures about the Councilmember's illegal and unethical practices. As a result, Huizar concocted a baseless reason to fire Leon and terminated Leon's employment with the City on October 31, 2019.
- 9. Leon's termination was particularly callous because, as Huizar well knew, Leon and his wife were expecting the birth of their first child that same month. Therefore, Huizar intentionally fired Leon at a time when a loss of income and health benefits would cause the most damage and upheaval in Leon's life.
- Among other reasons, Huizar terminated Leon's employment as reprisal for: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and FBI; (ii) the Councilmember's perception that Leon helped orchestrate Alvarez's and Medina's preceding civil suits against him; (iii) the counsel Leon gave Alvarez about how to return to her same pre-pregnancy position following her return from maternity leave; (iv) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of Alvarez's and Medina's lawsuits; (v) voicing concerns and complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (vi) Leon's intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son.
- 11. The proffered basis for Leon's termination was pretextual and the decision by Huizar to fire Leon, validated by other senior staff and managing agents, was rooted in retaliatory animus based upon Leon's internal and external complaints about Huizar's illegal and unethical practices, as well as Leon's protected participation in, and support, of other FEHA-based claims against Huizar and the City.

12. Pursuant to California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 et seq.) ("FEHA"), as well as provisions of the California Labor Code, this lawsuit seeks to redress the financial and emotional harm Leon suffered, and continues to suffer, as a result of the discrimination, harassment, and retaliation he endured while employed with Huizar, as well as on account of his wrongful termination.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 13. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution, in that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
- 14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Jose Huizar in this action pursuant to C.C.P. § 410.10, in that he is a resident of this state.
- 15. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the City of Los Angeles pursuant to C.C.P. § 410.10, in that the City is a municipality within this state.
- 16. Venue for this matter properly lies within Los Angeles County pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 395 and 395.5, in that Defendants' liability arises, and the injuries to Plaintiff occurred, in whole or in part, within Los Angeles County.
- 17. Prior to the initiation of this action before this Court, Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies as required under FEHA by filing a complaint against Defendants with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging, inter alia, the claims asserted herein. DFEH issued Plaintiff a "right-to-sue" letter on March 20, 2020. Accordingly, Plaintiff has fulfilled all preconditions to the filing of this FEHA-based suit. (Collectively attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of Plaintiff's administrative complaint and right-to-sue letter.)
- Prior to the initiation of this action before this Court, Plaintiff properly exhausted 18. his administrative remedies as required under Sections 945-949 of the California Government Code by filing a claim with the City of Los Angeles alleging, inter alia, the claims asserted

herein. Plaintiff submitted his government tort claim online on September 23, 2019. The City denied Leon's claim on October 29, 2019. Accordingly, Plaintiff has fulfilled all preconditions to the filing of this suit. (Collectively attached hereto as <u>Exhibit B</u> are true and correct copies of Plaintiff's government tort claim complaint and right-to-sue letter.)

PARTIES & RELEVANT NON-PARTIES

III.

- 19. Plaintiff Jesse Leon is an individual who, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, was a resident of Los Angeles County, California.
- 20. Defendant Jose Huizar is an individual who, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, was a resident of Los Angeles County, California. Huizar was at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, and continues to be as of the filing of this Complaint, a City Councilmember, representing the City's 14th District. Huizar took office in 2005 and, on account of City Council term limits, is expected to step down in 2020.
- 21. Defendant City of Los Angeles is a public entity which, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, employed Leon.
- 22. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times mentioned herein and otherwise relevant to the allegations of this Complaint, FEHA was in full force and effect, and binding on the City of Los Angeles, as the City regularly employed more than five persons within the State of California thereby bringing it within the provisions of FEHA's statutory scheme.
- 23. Given his position on the City Council and within his District's office, Huizar is a managing agent within the City and his District's office. He was able to exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in his office's decision-making such that his decisions ultimately determined office policy. Huizar had full responsibility for the operational functionality of his main office and field offices. He had the authority and discretion to dictate and implement policies and standards for the recruitment, hiring, and training of legislative, administrative, and operational staff; he had the authority and discretion to dictate and implement

legislative and community action agendas; and he had the authority and discretion to dictate and implement formal policies and informal practices in his offices with respect to responding to complaints of workplace discrimination, harassment, and other complaints of perceived violations of the law and breaches of City rules and policies.

- 24. Plaintiff herein alleges that some of the actions taken against him by employees of the City, and by Huizar in particular, occurred within the normal scope and course of these individuals' employment with the City. Plaintiff further alleges that several of these employee(s) were Plaintiff's supervisor(s) while Plaintiff was employed by the City. Thus, the City is vicariously liable for these individuals' actions under the doctrine of respondent superior.
- 25. Plaintiff herein further alleges that some of the actions taken against him by employees of the City, and by Huizar in particular, occurred outside the normal scope and course of these individuals employment with the City. Plaintiff alleges that such employees, and Huizar in particular, committed the wrongful acts alleged herein on their personal time, in their personal capacities, utilizing their personal discretion and, therefore, are personally liable for the same.
- 26. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the defendants sued as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive (the "DOE Defendants") and, therefore, sues these DOE Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when such is ascertained.
- 27. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the DOE Defendants acted wrongfully, maliciously, intentionally and negligently; that each is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings complained of herein; and that Plaintiff's injuries, as alleged herein, were proximately caused by the DOE Defendants, either through each Defendant's own conduct or through the conduct of their agents and/or employees.
- 28. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, each of the Defendants, whether named or fictitiously named as a DOE Defendant, were the merging entity, merged entity, subsidiary, acquiring corporation, agent and/or employee of each of the remaining Defendants, and in doing

the things hereinafter alleged, was acting within the course and scope of such agency and/or employment with knowledge, advice, permission and consent of each other.

- 29. As used herein, the term "Defendants" means all Defendants, both jointly and severally, and references by name to any one Defendant shall include and reference all Defendants, both individual, corporate and business entities, both specifically named and unnamed, and both jointly and severally to all.
- 30. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis allege, that at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, Defendants caused, aided, abetted, facilitated, encouraged, authorized, permitted and/or ratified the wrongful acts and omissions described in this Complaint.

IV.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Leon's Employment with Huizar

- 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 30, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 32. Leon first began working for Huizar in 2007 as a Field Deputy in the Councilmember's Boyle Heights office. Within a year's time, given Leon's political acumen and organizational skills, Huizar promoted Leon to Director of that office. Leon held that Director role for approximately three years and then left the City to attend law school.
- 33. Leon graduated from law school in 2014 and was approached by Huizar to come back and serve as his Campaign Manager for the Councilmember's reelection bid against then Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina. Leon accepted and assumed that role in October 2014. Molina was expected to be formidable opponent given her position, name recognition, and decades' long record of public service.
- 34. Moreover, at that time, Huizar had been sued for workplace harassment by Francine Godoy, his former Deputy Chief of Staff. Godoy filed a sexual harassment suit against

Huizar and the City contending that the Councilmember had retaliated against and harassed her after she broke off a sexual relationship with him.¹ Godoy filed her lawsuit in 2013 and the litigation persisted into 2014. Huizar admitted to the extramarital affair, but denied the harassment and retaliation allegations.

- 35. Still, Huizar understood that the extramarital affair and pending lawsuit were political liabilities that his opponent might use against him, so settled the case in 2014 before his reelection bid got fully underway such that the lawsuit would not be a continuing attack-point during the campaign.
- 36. Leon was not a part of the Godoy dealings. He came aboard the campaign just as Huizar settled that suit.
- 37. Huizar was reelected to his final term in 2015. As Huizar's Campaign Manager, Leon spent time a considerable amount of time with the Councilmember in the office, at various campaign events, political functions, and the like. Given the quantity and quality of time Leon has spent with Huizar, he knows the Councilmember quite well and is fully aware of Huizar's professional patterns and practices.
- 38. After the election, Huizar asked Leon to stay on as a fulltime, City-employed staffer. At that time, Huizar had ambitions for higher office, including a potential run for mayor, so wanted someone with Leon's political acumen and organizational skills to remain a permanent fixture on his executive team. Leon accepted the offer and officially became a City employee in March 2015.
- 39. Huizar hired Leon as his "Director of External Affairs." In that role, Leon was generally responsible for liaising and relationship-building with the labor unions and other influential political organizations that would need courting in the future. Leon was also responsible for making various policy recommendations for Huizar to support on Council, including those relating to affordable housing and economic development. Leon's annual salary was approximately \$100,000.

¹ Francine Godoy v. City of Los Angeles, et al., L.A. County Superior Court, Case No. BC524640.

B. Huizar Harassed and Retaliated Against Leon for Counseling Another Employee About How to Return to Work in the Same Position Following Her Maternity Leave

1. The Alvarez and Medina Lawsuits

- Assistant and Scheduler, sued Huizar and the City for wrongful termination, workplace harassment, and pregnancy discrimination.² As Huizar's Executive Assistant and Scheduler, Alvarez was primarily responsible for performing the initial assessment of the myriad requests to meet with Huizar as well as invitations for him to attend events. The requests came from lobbyists, campaign donors, other community and political leaders, businesspersons, and constituents. In other words, Alvarez was among Huizar's chief executive "gatekeepers." She would field the requests, research the requesting party, and provide Huizar with a written assessment of whether the meeting or event request was one he should accept because it aligned his political agenda. In that capacity, Alvarez was available to Huizar essentially 24/7. She was by no means Huizar's secretary or receptionist; Alvarez was among his senior executive staff.
- 41. In April 2018, Alvarez went on maternity leave. She was still Huizar's Executive Assistant and Administrative Scheduler when she left. When she returned from maternity leave, however, she was not. Huizar demoted Alvarez to an "office manager" position. In other words, Huizar reduced Alvarez's executive-level role to that of a receptionist. In fact, that is where Alvarez was physically relocated when she returned from leave; whereas she used to sit in the anteroom right outside of Huizar's office along with his other senior advisors like Leon, when Alvarez returned from maternity leave she was moved to the receptionists' desk at the front of the Councilmember's office suite to merely greet visitors and answer phones.
- 42. Huizar's decision to demote Alvarez was retaliatory in nature. Among other reasons, Huizar demoted Alvarez as reprisal for: (i) taking disability leave in advance of her pregnancy; (ii) taking maternity leave to give birth to a child and bond with her newborn son; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to alter Huizar's calendars in response to requests made pursuant to the California Public Records Act; (iv) voicing concerns and

² Mayra Alvarez v. Jose Huizar, et al., L.A. County Superior Court, Case No. 18STCV01722.

complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (v) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair.

- 43. Following the filing of Alvarez's suit, another ex-staffer named Pauline Medina, whom Huizar had likewise pushed out for speaking up against him, also had the courage to file suit. Medina filed suit in October 2018.³ Medina had worked for Huizar for nearly a decade, having served as the Councilmember's office manager and lead administrator since 2012.
- 44. In 2017, as did Alvarez and other of the Councilman's staffers, Medina became aware that Huizar was having another affair with one of the women that worked for him in his office. Medina had worked for Huizar since 2008, so was aware of his previously-admitted affair in 2013 with Francine Godoy and the resulting sexual harassment suit. Medina recalled vividly the type of friction and hostility that Huizar's prior affair caused in the office and could see that the Councilman's new relationship was triggering the same type of issues. Medina, as did other of the Councilman's staffers, believed that Huizar's mistress was receiving more favorable treatment with respect to assignments and more leniency with respect to deadlines and attendance. So, in October 2017, Medina began speaking out about it and complained to Huizar's Chief of Staff, Paul Habib.
- 45. Medina also at that time began complaining about certain practices employed by the Councilman's office that she believed violated local, state, and federal law, such as funneling City money to Huizar's high school alma mater, Bishop Mora Salesian High School, and secretly using City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses.
- 46. Consequently, Huizar and Habib retaliated against Medina for speaking out and undertook a campaign to push her out of the office. Among other things, Medina was stripped of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office, stripped of access to Huizar's calendar, subjected to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work, and subjected to

³ Pauline Medina v. Jose Huizar, et al., L.A. County Superior Court, Case No. 18STCV03011

unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons. Medina had no choice but to resign her City employment in June 2018.

2. <u>Huizar's Harassment and Retaliation Against Leon in the Wake of the</u> Alvarez and Medina Lawsuits

- 47. It was the filing of the Alvarez and Medina lawsuits that instigated Huizar's change of behavior and retaliatory conduct toward Leon. Huizar knew that Leon had counseled Alvarez about her legal rights upon returning to work following her maternity leave.
- 48. In June 2018, Alvarez called and spoke with Habib about her return to work following her maternity leave. Alvarez wanted to advise Habib about her impending return to the office and to coordinate the return of her workload from the staffer that had been temporarily assigned to Alvarez's duties.
- 49. Habib, however, was not receptive to Alvarez's efforts (since the decision had already been made to demote her) and was deliberately evasive about how to coordinate her return to work.
- 50. Alvarez then sought advice from Leon because she was concerned about the possibility of losing her position on account of having taken maternity leave. Leon counseled Alvarez about how to protect herself against that type of discrimination.
- 51. Among other things, Leon advised Alvarez to communicate with Habib in writing so that there would be a clear record of her requests to return to her regular duties at the conclusion of her leave. Alvarez copied Leon on one of her emails to Habib who, in turn, told Huizar about Leon's involvement. This angered Huizar and engendered extreme retaliatory animus in him toward Leon.
- 52. In October 2018, in the wake of the filing of the Alvarez and Medina lawsuits, Huizar was infuriated that his misconduct and second extramarital affair had been exposed, and quickly went on the attack with Leon, among others. The Councilmember confronted Leon about his involvement with the lawsuits. Huizar demanded to know whether Leon had drafted correspondence for Alvarez and accused Leon of orchestrating her lawsuit. From that moment

on, and on that basis, among others, Huizar has harbored retaliatory animus against Leon and undertaken actions to harass and harangue him.

- 53. Given the intense scrutiny on the Councilmember's office in the wake of the Alvarez and Medina lawsuits, Huizar knew that he could not outright fire Leon at that time. Thus, in the alternative, Huizar began stripping duties and responsibilities from Leon, reducing Leon's autonomy over certain tasks and projects, banning his participation in executive meetings, aggressively confronting him, and creating the impression that Leon was disloyal.
- 54. On that latter point, though, Huizar was correct in his reading of Leon. Leon had no intention of extending any loyalty to an elected official who he knew abused his power and authority, mistreated women, exploited subordinates, and pushed people out of their jobs with impunity. Leon knew, as did other staffers, that it was time to begin the process of detaching himself from the Councilmember and moving into a new role within City government. But that became virtually impossible given the circumstances that unfolded just weeks after the filing of the Alvarez and Medina suits.

C. Huizar Harassed and Retaliated Against Leon for Reporting His Concerns About the Councilmember's Illegal Activities to the FBI

- 55. In November 2018, just weeks after the filing of the Alvarez and Medina lawsuits, federal authorities raided Huizar's home and office. The FBI executed search warrants on both the Councilmember's personal residence as well as his City Hall office space.
- 56. That further infuriated Huizar and engendered retaliatory animus in him toward Leon, since the Councilmember irrationally believed that Leon and his former staffers could somehow instigate a federal investigation and direct the FBI to raid his office and home. Huizar then learned that Leon met with Federal authorities to discuss with the FBI what Leon knew about Huizar's in-office conduct, which angered the Councilmember even further.
- 57. In November 2018, the FBI contacted Leon to ask whether he would sit for an interview concerning the Councilmember's conduct, to which he agreed. Leon, a licensed attorney, believed that he had an ethical duty of candor and felt compelled to be as honest, forthcoming, and helpful to Federal authorities as he could.

- 58. What's more, Leon was not afraid to speak out against the Councilmember as were other of Huizar's staffers. Given Leon's former role as Huizar's Campaign Manager and the candid relationship dynamic he had with the Councilmember during the reelection bid, in no way did Leon feel compelled to kowtow to Huizar.
- 59. Thus, Leon was not shy about informing Habib that he intended to meet with the FBI, as per their request. Habib, in turn, advised Huizar about Leon's meeting with Federal authorities. This engendered further retaliatory animus in Huizar toward Leon, because the Councilmember assumed (as he should have) that Leon would be truthful about Huizar's in-office conduct and some of the backroom dealings that Leon believed Huizar was engaged in that were likely violations of the law.
- 60. In November 2018, Leon met with Federal authorities and described the kind of extortionist tactics that he believed Huizar would employ with respect to those seeking to open cannabis businesses within his district and who, therefore, would need the Councilmember's sign-off on their Public Convenience or Necessity Application ("PCN") to do so.
- 61. As Leon perceived it, Huizar was angling to employ the same tactics that many suspected he had been undertaking with real estate developers as PLUM Committee chairperson—a "pay-to-play" scheme in which one would not get development approval unless Huizar was first compensated, either through direct personal payment or with a campaign donation, or a "gift" to Salesian High School.
- 62. After learning about Leon's meeting with Federal authorities, and in retaliation therefor, Huizar continued stripping duties and responsibilities from Leon, reducing Leon's autonomy over certain tasks and projects, banning his participation in executive meetings, aggressively confronting him, and creating an impression that Leon was disloyal and incompetent.
- 63. The Alvarez and Medina lawsuits and FBI raids created a stain on Huizar's already tarnished reputation, and created a cloud of doubt over everyone who worked in his office. Leon wanted to continue working in City government, and had made inquiries about

employment in other Councilmembers' offices, but was told that people from Huizar's office were "radioactive" and would be blackballed from other City jobs.

D. Huizar Harassed and Retaliated Against Leon for Meeting with the City Attorney's Office to Discuss the Credibility of Alvarez's and Medina's Allegations

- 64. Things got worse when Leon was asked by the City Attorney's Office to sit for an interview with respect to his knowledge of the allegations in the two civil suits filed against Huizar by Alvarez and Medina.
- 65. In April 2019, the City Attorney's Office contacted Leon and asked to interview him concerning Alvarez's and Medina's accusations against Huizar and the City, to which Leon agreed.
- 66. The City Attorney's Office informed Habib about their Leon meeting who, in turn, notified Huizar.
- 67. As with Leon's meeting with Federal authorities, his meeting with the City Attorney's Office also infuriated Huizar and engendered further retaliatory animus in him toward Leon, because the Councilmember knew that Leon could offer damaging information about his in-office conduct.
- 68. Leon was quite clear with the City Attorney's Office that he was profoundly uncomfortable with the fact that they had copied Habib on their emails about the interview, but the damage was already done.
- 69. After learning about Leon's meeting with the City Attorney's Office, and in retaliation therefor, Huizar continued stripping duties and responsibilities from Leon, reducing Leon's autonomy over certain tasks and projects, banning his participation in executive meetings, aggressively confronting him, and creating an impression that Leon was disloyal and incompetent.

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- E. Huizar Fired Leon for Meeting with the City Attorney's Office and City Ethics Commission to Discuss His Belief that the Councilmember Might Attempt to Extort Cannabis Operators
- 70. In mid-2018, prior to the Alvarez and Medina lawsuits and the FBI raids, Huizar assigned Leon to be one of his cannabis policy advisors, to which Leon agreed.
- 71. However, following the FBI raids that November, then Council President Herb Wesson stripped Huizar of all of his Council Committee assignments. Huizar, of course, wielded his greatest power and influence over the PLUM Committee. But Huizar also sat on the Cannabis Regulation Committee that Wesson chaired. He lost both spots.
- 72. After that, Huizar was effectively rendered a lame duck and there was not much for Leon to do with respect to cannabis. The only thing Leon was principally tasked with doing was to continue meeting with potential cannabis proprietors who wanted to open retail shops in the Downtown Los Angeles area ("DTLA"). Given that there was an over-concentration of commercial retailers in DTLA, those businesses needed an approved permit from Huizar to operate in his district (PCN). Yet, in the wake of the FBI raids, Huizar took full control over which businesses the office would agree to meet with and cut Leon out of that loop entirely.
- 73. Nearly a year later, in August 2019, Leon and his wife submitted an application to the Department of Cannabis Regulation's "Social Equity Program" ("SEP") in advance of the impending rollout of its cannabis retail licensing application process.
- 74. In general, the SEP was a policy means by which the City hoped to right the wrong of the over-prosecution and over-sentencing of marijuana-related crimes in certain inner city neighborhoods. Thus, the City made it such that the Cannabis Department would first only open up the retail license application process to individuals who could demonstrate that they were from one of those effected neighborhoods and "prequalified" through the SEP. So, the SEP application was not an actual application for a cannabis license; that process had not yet begun. It was going to be the case, though, that one could not even apply during the initial phase of the cannabis licensing process unless you had first been "prequalified" as an SEP applicant.

- 75. Leon did not consult or advise Huizar about his and his wife's SEP application. And Leon had no obligation to do so, particularly since neither Huizar nor his office had any influence or control over the SEP acceptances.
- 76. In response to his SEP application, Leon was advised by the Cannabis

 Department that it could no longer share cannabis-related information with him in his capacity as
 a Huizar staffer and given his intention of seeking to acquire a retail cannabis license.

 Leon, in turn, advised the Cannabis Department that he had not decided whether he would be
 applying for an actual cannabis license in the future, and further advised that he would seek
 guidance from the City Ethics Commission and City Attorney's Office before doing so.
- 77. Leon met with David Tristan, the Deputy Executive Director of the City Ethics Commission the following morning. Leon discussed with Tristan whether there was any conflict of interest with respect to his SEP application. Tristan advised that there was not, but encouraged Leon to also consult the City Attorney's Office since it at times tended to offer conclusions contrary to the Ethics Commission.
- 78. Leon then discussed with Tristan, as he had with the FBI, his concerns that Huizar had begun efforts to extort cannabis retailers seeking PCN approvals in the Councilmember's district. Tristan asked whether Leon wanted to file a formal ethics complaint, which he declined (since everyone knew there was already an ongoing FBI investigation).
- 79. Later that same afternoon, Leon emailed Assistant City Attorney Renee Stadell from the Office's "Ethics, Elections and Governance" group. The pair eventually connected by phone that day and, as Tristan cautioned, Stadell's conclusion was contrary to his. Stadell advised that she believed there was the "appearance" of a conflict of interest given Leon's cannabis-related work in Huizar's office, however limited, and counseled Leon to wall himself off from further cannabis-related tasks and projects pending his SEP application.
- 80. Leon concluded his initial phone conversation with Stadell by telling her that he indeed intended to withdraw his SEP application. But then, to Leon's profound dismay, Stadell advised that she would be contacting Huizar's office to inform them about the potential conflict. Leon could not understand that. He assumed there would be some kind of discretion or safe-

harbor in consulting the Ethics Commission and City Attorney's Office—not that they would immediately turn around and tell Huizar. Moreover, considering that it was widely known that Huizar was under investigation by Federal authorities and that there were already two pending civil suits against him for employment retaliation, Leon could not understand the logic in disclosing his meetings with them to Huizar and exposing Leon to potential reprisal.

- 81. The next day, Leon met with Tristan again to discuss his meeting with Stadell and her countervailing conclusion about the conflict of interest. Despite his disagreement with Stadell's conclusion, Leon told Tristan, just has he had advised Stadell, that he intended to withdraw his SEP application. He did so later that evening.
- 82. The following morning, Leon received an email from Huizar's Executive Assistant and Scheduler advising that Huizar and Habib wanted to meet with him later that day.
- 83. During that meeting, Huizar confronted Leon about his SEP application and Leon's discussions about the Councilmember with the City Ethics Commission and City Attorney's Office. As with Leon's previous meetings with Federal authorities and the City Attorney's Office, his recent meetings with respect to cannabis likewise engendered retaliatory animus in Huizar toward Leon. The Councilmember believed that Leon had exposed (and, thus, thwarted) Huizar's next "pay-to-play" scheme. Consequently, Huizar placed Leon on administrative leave that day "pending further investigation."
- 84. Thereafter, on September 16, 2019, at Huizar's direction, Habib sent Leon a termination letter indicating that Leon would be fired as of October 31, 2019.
- 85. Huizar's decision to terminate Leon's employment was particularly malicious based on the circumstances described above, but also because Huizar knew quite well that Leon and his wife were expecting their first child in October and, thus, deliberately aligned the timing of Leon's firing with that profound family event.
- 86. Huizar's decision to terminate Leon's employment was retaliatory in nature.

 Among other reasons, Huizar terminated Leon's employment as reprisal for: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and FBI; (ii) the Councilmember's perception that Leon helped orchestrate

Alvarez's and Medina's preceding civil suits against him; (iii) the counsel Leon gave Alvarez about how to return to her same pre-pregnancy position following her return from maternity leave; (iv) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of Alvarez's and Medina's lawsuits; (v) voicing concerns and complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (vi) Leon's intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Retaliation

In Violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (h), 12945(a) (Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 87. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 86, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 88. Section 12940(h) of the California Government Code makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for "oppos[ing] practices forbidden under [FEHA's statutory scheme] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [FEHA's statutory scheme]."
- 89. As described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under FEHA by complaining to and about Defendants' conduct. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and FBI; (ii) the counsel Leon gave Alvarez about how to return to her same prepregnancy position following her return from maternity leave; (iii) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of Alvarez's and Medina's lawsuits; (iv) voicing concerns and complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (v) voicing his intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son (see infra at Sect. IV)).

- 90. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute, (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 91. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment and, prior thereto, to subject him to abusive and harassing retaliatory employment practices. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against him.
- 92. In response to Plaintiff's protected activities, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping duties and responsibilities from him; reducing Plaintiff's autonomy over certain tasks and projects; banning his participation in executive meetings; aggressively confronting him; and creating the impression that Leon was disloyal and incompetent (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).
- 93. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 94. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 95. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice

pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.

- 96. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
- 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 12965(b) of the California Government Code.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Retaliation

In Violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b)

(Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 98. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 97, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 99. Section 1102.5(b) of the California Labor Code makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for "disclosing information . . . to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance . . . of state or federal statute . . . or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties."
- 100. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under section 1102.5 by complaining to and about Defendant's conduct, as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and FBI; (ii) the counsel Leon gave Alvarez about how to return to her same pre-pregnancy position following her return from maternity leave;

(iii) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of Alvarez's and Medina's lawsuits; (iv) voicing concerns and complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (v) voicing his intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).

- 101. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute, (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 102. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment and, prior thereto, to subject him to abusive and harassing retaliatory employment practices. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against him.
- 103. In response to Plaintiff's protected activities, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping duties and responsibilities from him; reducing Plaintiff's autonomy over certain tasks and projects; banning his participation in executive meetings; aggressively confronting him; and creating the impression that Leon was disloyal and incompetent (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).
- 104. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 105. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment

benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.

- 106. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 107. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
- 108. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 1102.5(f) of the California Labor Code.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 109. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 108, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 110. The discharge of an employee in retaliation for resisting or complaining about employer violations of laws that secure important public policies contravenes those policies, and gives rise to a common law action in tort.
- 111. Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under FEHA and under section 1102.5 of the Civil Code by complaining to and about Defendants' conduct, as described above. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics

Commission, and FBI; (ii) the counsel Leon gave Alvarez about how to return to her same prepregnancy position following her return from maternity leave; (iii) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of Alvarez's and Medina's lawsuits; (iv) voicing concerns and complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (v) voicing his intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).

- 112. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute, (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 113. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment and, prior thereto, to subject him to abusive and harassing retaliatory employment practices. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against him.
- 114. Plaintiff was harassed and subsequently terminated for asserting his statutory and constitutional rights to engage in protected activity. Defendants' violation of Plaintiff's statutory and constitutional rights is inconsistent with, and hostile to, the public's interest in correcting violations of state and federal laws and regulations, and has a chilling effect on reports of such actual and suspected violations of state and federal laws and regulations.
- 115. Defendants' reasons for harassing Plaintiff and subsequently terminating Plaintiff's employment are pretextual in nature and calculated to disguise the motivating bases of the adverse employment actions to which Plaintiff was subjected.
- 116. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in

Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

- 117. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 118. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 119. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to Prevent Unlawful Discrimination
In Violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k)
(Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 120. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 119, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 121. Section 12940(k) of the California Government Code makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring."

- 122. As described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct under FEHA by complaining to and about Defendant's conduct. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and FBI; (ii) the counsel Leon gave Alvarez about how to return to her same pre-pregnancy position following her return from maternity leave; (iii) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of Alvarez's and Medina's lawsuits; (iv) voicing concerns and complaining about having to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work hours and while utilizing City resources; and (v) voicing his intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).
- 123. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute, (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 124. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment and, prior thereto, to subject him to abusive and harassing retaliatory employment practices. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against him.
- 125. In response to Plaintiff's protected activities, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping duties and responsibilities from him; reducing Plaintiff's autonomy over certain tasks and projects; banning his participation in executive meetings; aggressively confronting him; and creating the impression that Leon was disloyal and incompetent (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).
- 126. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income,

salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

- 127. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 128. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 129. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
- 130. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 12965(b) of the California Government Code.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

(Against Jose Huizar, in his individual capacity, and Does 1-10)

- 131. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 130, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 132. "A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is '(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." *Hughes v. Pair*, 46 Cal. 4th 1035 (2009).

- 133. Defendants' conduct as described above—harassing, hassling, and aggressively confronting Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping duties and responsibilities from him; reducing Plaintiff's autonomy over certain tasks and projects; banning his participation in executive meetings; creating the impression that Leon was disloyal and incompetent; and deliberately timing Plaintiff's termination to coincide with the birth of his firstborn child (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV))—goes beyond all possible bounds of decency of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.
- 134. Defendants devoted little or no thought to the probable distress such acts would cause Plaintiff, and simply acted in reckless disregard to the possibility that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress as a result of such acts.
- 135. Defendants' acts did in fact cause Plaintiff to suffer, among other emotions, anguish, nervousness, anxiety, grief, worry, shock, humiliation, and embarrassment. The distress is of such severity that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to bear the same.
- 136. Defendants' conduct was outrageous and outside the normal scope of the employment relationship and was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm.
- 137. Defendants' acts subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in violation of his rights as an employee under California law. Defendant acted with malice in that Defendants' actions were intended to injure Plaintiff, and did so, and because such despicable acts were carried out with a willful disregard for Plaintiff's legal rights and personal wellbeing.
- 138. Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for

growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.

- 139. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 140. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 141. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial to resolve each and every one of the claims averred in this Complaint against each and every Defendant.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, according to proof, as follows:

On the First Cause of Action for Retaliation (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (h)), 12945(a):

- 1. For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
- 2. For compensatory and emotional distress damages;

1	3.	For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;
2	4.	For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;
3	5.	For an award of prejudgment interest;
4	6.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
5	On the Secon	d Cause for Retaliation (Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b)):
6	1.	For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
7	2.	For compensatory and emotional distress damages;
8	3.	For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;
9	4.	For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;
10	5.	For an award of prejudgment interest;
11	6.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
12	On the Third	Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Cal. Gov. Code
13	§ 12940(k)):	
۱4	1.	For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
15	2.	For compensatory and emotional distress damages;
16	3.	For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;
17	4.	For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;
18	5.	For an award of prejudgment interest;
19	6.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
20	On the Fourt	h Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940(a),
21	(h), (j)):	
22	1.	For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;
23	2.	For compensatory and emotional distress damages;
24	3.	For punitive and exemplary damages
25	4.	For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;
26	5.	For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;
27	6.	For an award of prejudgment interest;
28	7.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

On the Fifth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial; 1. 2. For compensatory and emotional distress damages; For punitive and exemplary damages 3. For an award of prejudgment interest; 4. 5. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. THE LAW OFFICE OF TERRENCE JONES DATED: March 24, 2020 Terrence Jones Attorneys for Plaintiff JESSE LEON

Exhibit A



DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

KEVIN KISH, DIRECTOR

2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100 I Elk Grove I CA I 95758 (800) 884-1684 (Voice) I (800) 700-2320 (TTY) | California's Relay Service at 711 http://www.dfeh.ca.gov I Email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov

March 20, 2020

Terrence Jones 6737 Bright Avenue, Suite B6 Whittier, California 90601

RE: **Notice to Complainant's Attorney**

> DFEH Matter Number: 202003-09670620 Right to Sue: Leon / City of Los Angeles

Dear Terrence Jones:

Attached is a copy of your complaint of discrimination filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. Also attached is a copy of your Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue.

Pursuant to Government Code section 12962, DFEH will not serve these documents on the employer. You must serve the complaint separately, to all named respondents. Please refer to the attached Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue for information regarding filing a private lawsuit in the State of California. A courtesy "Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint" is attached for your convenience.

Be advised that the DFEH does not review or edit the complaint form to ensure that it meets procedural or statutory requirements.

Sincerely,

Department of Fair Employment and Housing

KEVIN KISH, DIRECTOR



DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100 I Elk Grove I CA I 95758 (800) 884-1684 (Voice) I (800) 700-2320 (TTY) | California's Relay Service at 711 http://www.dfeh.ca.gov I Email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov

March 20, 2020

RE: Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint

DFEH Matter Number: 202003-09670620 Right to Sue: Leon / City of Los Angeles

To All Respondent(s):

Enclosed is a copy of a complaint of discrimination that has been filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) in accordance with Government Code section 12960. This constitutes service of the complaint pursuant to Government Code section 12962. The complainant has requested an authorization to file a lawsuit. This case is not being investigated by DFEH and is being closed immediately. A copy of the Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue is enclosed for your records.

Please refer to the attached complaint for a list of all respondent(s) and their contact information.

No response to DFEH is requested or required.

Sincerely,

Department of Fair Employment and Housing



DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100 I Elk Grove I CA I 95758 (800) 884-1684 (Voice) I (800) 700-2320 (TTY) | California's Relay Service at 711 http://www.dfeh.ca.gov I Email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov

March 20, 2020

Jesse Leon 6737 Bright Ave Ste B6 Whittier, California 90601

RE: Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue

> DFEH Matter Number: 202003-09670620 Right to Sue: Leon / City of Los Angeles

Dear Jesse Leon,

This letter informs you that the above-referenced complaint was filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) has been closed effective March 20, 2020 because an immediate Right to Sue notice was requested. DFEH will take no further action on the complaint.

This letter is also your Right to Sue notice. According to Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), a civil action may be brought under the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act against the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency named in the above-referenced complaint. The civil action must be filed within one year from the date of this letter.

To obtain a federal Right to Sue notice, you must contact the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to file a complaint within 30 days of receipt of this DFEH Notice of Case Closure or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earlier.

Sincerely,

Department of Fair Employment and Housing

BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING **Under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act** 3 (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) 4 In the Matter of the Complaint of 5 Jesse Leon DFEH No. 202003-09670620 6 Complainant, VS. 7 City of Los Angeles 8 200 N Spring St Ste 360 9 Los Angeles, California 90012 10 Respondents 11 12 1. Respondent City of Los Angeles is an employer subject to suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). 13 2. Complainant Jesse Leon, resides in the City of Whittier State of California. 14 3. Complainant alleges that on or about October 31, 2019, respondent took the 15 following adverse actions: 16 Complainant was harassed because of complainant's family care or medical leave 17 (cfra) (employers of 50 or more people), other, pregnancy, childbirth, breast feeding, and/or related medical conditions, baby bonding leave (employers of 20 - 49 18 people), association with a member of a protected class. 19 Complainant was discriminated against because of complainant's family care or 20 medical leave (cfra) (employers of 50 or more people), other, pregnancy, childbirth, breast feeding, and/or related medical conditions, association with a member of a 21 protected class and as a result of the discrimination was terminated, denied any employment benefit or privilege, denied family care or medical leave (cfra) 22 (employers of 50 or more people), denied accommodation for pregnancy, other, 23 denied baby bonding leave (employers of 20-49 people).

COMPLAINT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Complaint - DFEH No. 202003-09670620

Complainant experienced retaliation because complainant reported or resisted any form of discrimination or harassment, requested or used baby bonding leave

(employers of 20-49 people), participated as a witness in a discrimination or

Date Filed: March 20, 2020

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
harassment complaint, requested or used leave under the california family rights act or fmla (employers of 50 or more people) and as a result was terminated, denied any 2 employment benefit or privilege, denied family care or medical leave (cfra) (employers of 50 or more people), denied accommodation for pregnancy, other, 3 denied baby bonding leave (employers of 20-49 people). 4 5 Additional Complaint Details: Complainant Jesse Leon was subjected to unlawful harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and 6 Housing Act (FEHA) on account of his: assistance in a FEHA-based proceeding; paternity leave; sick leave; and complaints of potential violations of local, state, and federal law. Complainant was employed by the City of Los Angeles (the "City") and worked for Jose Huizar, the City's Councilmember for its 14th District. Complainant was employed as Huizar's "Director of External Affairs." On August 9, 2019, Huizar placed Leon on an administrative leave. On September 16, 2019, Huizar subsequently issued Leon a letter of termination that discharged Leon's employment 10 with the City as of October 31, 2019. The termination was wrongful, pretextual, and illegal under FEHA. Among other reasons, Huizar terminated Leon's employment as 11 reprisal for: (i) voicing concerns about Huizar's illegal and unethical conduct to the City Attorney's Office, City Ethics Commission, and FBI; (ii) the Councilmember's 12 perception that Leon helped orchestrate two other former staff members' preceding 13 civil suits against him and the City; (iii) the counsel Leon gave a former staff member about how to return to her same pre-pregnancy position following her return from 14 maternity leave; (iv) speaking truthfully to the City Attorney's Office about the merits of those staff members' lawsuits; (v) voicing concerns and complaining about having 15 to engage in political campaign activities for Huizar's wife during normal City work 16 hours and while utilizing City resources; and (vi) Leon's intention to take paternity leave upon the birth of his son. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Complaint – DFEH No. 202003-09670620

28 Date Filed: March 20, 2020

1	VERIFICATION
2	I, Terrence Jones , am the Attorney in the above-entitled complaint. I have read the foregoing complaint and know the contents thereof. The matters alleged are based on information and belief, which I believe to be true.
4 5	On March 20, 2020, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
6	Whittier, CA
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27	-3- Complaint – DFEH No. 202003-09670620
28	Date Filed: March 20, 2020

Exhibit B



MIKE FEUER CITY ATTORNEY

October 29, 2019

Jesse Leon c/o Law Offices of Terrence Jones, APC 6737 Bright Avenue, Suite B6 Whittier, California 90601

Re: Claimant:

Jesse Leon

Claim No.

C20-01531

Dear Mr. Leon:

Your claim against the City has been referred to this Office. After reviewing the circumstances of your claim and the applicable law, we have come to the conclusion that your claim should be denied. This letter represents a formal notice to you that your claim has been denied. In view of this action, we are required by law to give you the following warning:

WARNING

Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six months (6) from the date this notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action. See Government Section 945.6.

You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.

Very truly yours,

HUÓO S. ROSSITTER

Deputy City Attorney

PROOF OF SERVICE OF CLAIM RESPONSE

I, the undersigned state: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within Claim for Damages, C20-01531. My business address is 800 City Hall East, 200 North Main Street, Los Angeles, California.

On October 29, 2019, I served the foregoing document(s) described as:

LETTER RE: CLAIM NO. C20-01531

on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

Jesse Leon c/o Law Offices of Terrence Jones, APC 6737 Bright Ave., Ste. B6 Whittier, CA 90601

[X] BY MAIL - I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it is deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day, at Los Angeles, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one (1) day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 29, 2019 at Los Angeles, California.

MARISOL CONTRERAS